Supreme court confidential informant search warrant

The warrants were obtained under the Provincial Offences Act, R. The identical informations were sworn to by Roger Weber, an agricultural investigator with the Ministry of Natural Resources. On approximately August 26, , the investigation by the Ministry of Natural Resources into the operation of Aylmer was discussed on various media reports.

The suitability for human consumption of meat slaughtered and processed by Aylmer became a public discussion. On around August 27, , the Ontario Provincial Police began a fraud investigation into the business affairs of Aylmer. The officers involved in that investigation were advised that Inspector Weber had applied for and obtained the search warrants that were executed on August 21, and August 22, The Crown brought an ex parte application for an order sealing the search warrants, the informations used to obtain the warrants, and related documents in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Crown claimed that disclosing the material to the public could identify a confidential informant and could interfere with the ongoing criminal investigation. Justice Livingstone made an order directing that the warrants and informations were to be sealed the sealing order would expire December 2, along with the affidavit of Detective Sergeant Andre Clelland and a letter, dated September 2, , from Roger Weber.

The affidavit was filed in support of the application for a sealing order. Toronto Star Newspapers Limited and other media outlets brought a motion for certiorari and mandamus in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice. On September 24, , the Superior Court overturned the sealing order and directed that the documents should be made public except to the extent that the contents of the informations could disclose the identity of a confidential informant.

The court also edited one of the informations to delete references to material that could identify the confidential informant and told counsel that the edited version would be made available to the public unless the Crown appealed within two days.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario held that the judge granting the order to seal had exceeded her jurisdiction by refusing to grant a brief adjournment to allow counsel for the media to attend and make submissions on the application for a sealing order. Fish, J. The Court found that the Crown did not discharge its burden in this case to seal the warrant documents. There are not many state decisions in this area. A majority of them hold against a firm right to disclosure.

The leading case requiring disclosure is Priestly v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. City of Jackson, Miss. Tennessee had held the same way in Smith v.

Conclusion

State, Tenn. Edwards, S. Cookson, S. We read Drouin v. State, Md. By a vote of 4 to 3 the Supreme Court of Illinois held that disclosure should not be required. People v. Durr, 28 Ill. The Ohio Supreme Court has held against disclosure, State v. Beck, Ohio St. Coffey, 12 N.

Also arrayed against disclosure are Dixon v. State, 39 Ala. Hardy, So. State, Tex. United States, 84 S. There a search warrant had issued. In an attack upon the warrant defendant sought unsuccessfully to obtain the identity of the informant whose information figured prominently in the narration of probable cause.

In doing so the majority did not refer to Roviaro from which we quoted above the passage suggesting the Government is required to reveal an informant when the search is made Without a warrant. The majority referred to Roviaro only in rejecting the further claim that disclosure was also needed to aid the defendant upon the ultimate issue of guilt.

• Site Navigation?
• New Jersey Case Law: State v. Burnett.
• Tennessee court changes rules on police search warrants?
• NJ Case Law: Disclosing the Name of a CI?

The four dissenting justices concluded that disclosure should have been ordered to aid a defense on the merits, but made no reference to the majority holding with respect to disclosure upon the issue of probable cause to search. We are not sure of the full implication of Rugendorf upon the right to disclosure on a challenge to a search.

The majority opinion may rest upon the thesis that defendant sought disclosure for specific reasons which were inadequate and hence he might have fared better if, for example, he had questioned the statement of the officer-affiant that an informant existed.

Site Navigation

The majority opinion may, however, mean that, whatever the rule is in the case of a search without a warrant, there should not be disclosure of the informant when the search is under a warrant. In this connection we note that although in Priestly, supra, 51 Cal. Keener, 55 Cal. The court said Priestly was calculated to encourage officers to seek a search warrant and ought not to be applied where the officer did follow that course.

The foregoing survey reflects the diverse views upon this difficult subject. We are satisfied that there is no federal expression settling the issue in constitutional terms. More specifically, the quoted excerpt from Roviaro has not been thought to state a view of the Fourth Amendment binding upon us under Mapp v. Ohio, supra, U. In the words of Roviaro U. He has nothing to lose and the prize may be the suppression of damaging evidence if the State cannot afford to reveal its source, as is so often the case. And since there is no way to test the good faith of a defendant who presses the demand, we must assume the routine demand would have to be routinely granted.

Perhaps that approach would sharpen investigatorial techniques, but we doubt that there would be enough talent and time to cope with crime upon that basis. The affidavit won't give specific reasons to doubt that the informant is credible. Down the road, the warrant will be challenged on the ground that the affidavit failed to tell the judge of good reasons to think the informant was biased and unreliable. Maybe the informant was facing criminal charges and had every incentive to manufacture evidence that others were involved in crimes to strike a better deal for himself.

Maybe the informant was the suspect's estranged spouse in the middle of a bitter divorce battle, and she was trying to get him arrested to help get custody of the kids. In each of the cases, the defendant claims that the warrant should be voided because the government failed to disclose the informant's bias. If the government hadn't misled the court, the argument runs, no warrant would have issued because the judge would have seen that the informant could not be trusted. How has this argument fared? It depends on the case.

Most of the time, though, it hasn't fared very well. Part of the problem is that judges figure that of course informants are often biased. Informants usually have ulterior motives, and judges don't need to be told that. A helpful case is United States v. Strifler, F.

Probable cause was based largely on a confidential informant who told the police that he had not only seen a meth lab in the house but had even helped others to try to manufacture meth there. The magistrate judge issued the warrant based on the informant's detailed tip. The search was successful and charges followed. The defendants challenged the warrant on the ground that the affidavit had failed to mention the remarkable ulterior motives of the informant. The affidavit didn't mention that the "informant" was actually a married couple that had been in a quarrel with the defendants; that the couple was facing criminal charges themselves and had been "guaranteed by the prosecutor that they would not be prosecuted if they provided information"; and that they had been paid by the government for giving the information.

The affidavit didn't mention any of that. A big deal, right? According to the court, no.