Prison records for michael dean cain from kaufman texas

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The Court determined that the retroactivity of Mapp should be determined by examining the purpose of the exclusionary rule, the reliance of the States on prior law, and the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the exclusionary rule. Using that standard, the Court held that Mapp would only apply to trials commencing after that case was decided. The Linkletter retroactivity standard has not led to consistent results. Instead, it has been used to limit application of certain new rules to cases on direct review, other new rules only to the defendants in the cases announcing such rules, and still other new rules to cases in which trials have not yet commenced.

See Desist v. Not surprisingly, commentators have "had a veritable field day" with the Linkletter standard, with much of the discussion being "more han mildly negative. Application of the Linkletter standard led to the disparate treatment of similarly situated defendants on direct review. For example, in Miranda v. Arizona, U. The Court applied that new rule to the defendants in Miranda and its companion cases, and held that their convictions could not stand because they had been interrogated without the proper warnings.

In Johnson v. New Jersey, U. Because the defendant in Johnson, like the defendants in Miranda, was on direct review of his conviction, see U. This inequity also generated vehement criticism. Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress decrying the "plain" injustice in Johnson and suggesting that the Court should have distinguished between direct and collateral review for purposes of retroactivity.

Dissatisfied with the Linkletter standard, Justice Harlan advocated a different approach to retroactivity. He argued that new rules should always be applied retroactively to cases on direct review, but that generally they should not be applied retroactively to criminal cases on collateral review.

See Mackey v. In Griffith v. We agreed with Justice Harlan that "failure to apply a newly declared constitutional rule to criminal cases pending on direct review violates basic norms of constitutional adjudication. We gave two reasons for our decision. First, because we can only promulgate new rules in specific cases and cannot possibly decide all cases in which review is sought, "the integrity of judicial review" requires the application of the new rule to "all similar cases pending on direct review.

We quoted approvingly from Justice Harlan's separate opinion in Mackey, supra, U. In truth, the Court's assertion of power to disregard current law in adjudicating cases before us that have not already run the full course of appellate review is quite simply an assertion that our constitutional function is not one of adjudication but in effect of legislation. Although new rules that constituted clear breaks with the past generally were not given retroactive effect under the Linkletter standard, we held that "a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a 'clear break' with the past.

The Linkletter standard also led to unfortunate disparity in the treatment of similarly situated defendants on collateral review. An example will best illustrate the point. In Edwards v. It was not until Solem v. Stumes, U. In the interim, several lower federal courts had come to the opposite conclusion and had applied Edwards to cases that had become final before that decision was announced.

See Witt v. Wainwright, F. Maggio, F. Housewright, F. McCree v. Lockhart, U. Thus, some defendants on collateral review whose Edwards claims were adjudicated prior to Stumes received the benefit of Edwards, while those whose Edwards claims had not been addressed prior to Stumes did not. This disparity in treatment was a product of two factors: our failure to treat retroactivity as a threshold question and the Linkletter standard's inability to account for the nature and function of collateral review. Having decided to rectify the first of those inadequacies, see supra, at , we now turn to the second.

Justice Harlan believed that new rules generally should not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review. He argued that retroactivity for cases on collateral review could "be responsibly determined only by focusing, in the first instance, on the nature, function, and scope of the adjudicatory process in which such cases arise.

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The relevant frame of reference, in other words, is not the purpose of the new rule whose benefit the defendant seeks, but instead the purposes for which the writ of habeas corpus is made available. With regard to the nature of habeas corpus, Justice Harlan wrote:.

It is not designed as a substitute for direct review. The interest in leaving concluded litigation in a state of repose, that is, reducing the controversy to a final judgment not subject to further judicial revision, may quite legitimately be found by those responsible for defining the scope of the writ to outweigh in some, many, or most instances the competing interest in readjudicating convictions according to all legal standards in effect when a habeas petition is filed. Given the "broad scope of constitutional issues cognizable on habeas," Justice Harlan argued that it is "sounder, in adjudicating habeas petitions, generally to apply the law prevailing at the time a conviction became final th n it is to seek to dispose of habeas cases on the basis of intervening changes in constitutional interpretation.

As he had explained in Desist, "the threat of habeas serves as a necessary additional incentive for trial and appellate courts throughout the land to conduct their proceedings in a manner consistent with established constitutional standards. In order to perform this deterrence function,. See also Stumes, U. Justice Harlan identified only two exceptions to his general rule of nonretroactivity for cases on collateral review.

First, a new rule should be applied retroactively if it places "certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe. Second, a new rule should be applied retroactively if it requires the observance of "those procedures that.

Connecticut, U. Last Term, in Yates v. Franklin, U. We held that Francis did not announce a new rule because it "was merely an application of the principle that governed our decision in Sandstrom v. Montana, U. We therefore found it unnecessary to adopt Justice Harlan's view of retroactivity for cases on collateral review. We stated, however, that our recent decisions had noted, as had Justice Harlan, "the important distinction between direct review and collateral review.

See also Pennsylvania v. Finley, U. Indeed, we have expressly reconciled some of our retroactivity decisions with Justice Harlan's approach. See Shea v. We agree with Justice Harlan's description of the function of habeas corpus.

Wilson, U. Rather, we have recognized that interests of comity and finality must also be considered in determining the proper scope of habeas review. Thus, if a defendant fails to comply with state procedural rules and is barred from litigating a particular constitutional claim in state court, the claim can be considered on federal habeas only if the defendant shows cause for the default and actual prejudice resulting therefrom.

See Wainwright v. We have declined to make the application of the procedural default rule dependent on the magnitude of the constitutional claim at issue, see Engle v. Carrier, U.

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This Court has not "always followed an unwavering line in its conclusions as to the availability of the Great Writ. Our development of the law of federal habeas corpus has been attended, seemingly, with some backing and filling. Noia, U.

See also Stone v. Powell, U. Nevertheless, it has long been established that a final civil judgment entered under a given rule of law may withstand subsequent judicial change in that rule.

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In Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, U. The Court based its decision in large part on finality concerns. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.

Questions of. Accord, Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. Tolmie, 2 Pet. These underlying considerations of finality find significant and compelling parallels in the criminal context. Application of constitutional rules not in existence at the time a conviction became final seriously undermines the principle of finality which is essential to the operation of our criminal justice system.