Large parts of the country -- both urban and rural -- with no 5G at all. A map of Atlanta, showing T-Mobile's 5G coverage. To check for yourself whether 5G is -- or isn't -- available in your area, Ookla is tracking the global rollout of 5G networks through its Speedtest. The Speedtest interactive map lets you drill down to the city-level to see which companies have deployed 5G. The map, however, doesn't tell the whole story. As a next step, compare where you live and work or attend school with each carrier's coverage map.
If you're frequently near a carrier's hotspots, that might push you to 5G sooner rather than later. Ookla is tracking the rollout of 5G networks across the US and globe, updating its interactive map weekly. The 5G rollout across the US will happen slowly. Apple , for example, is rumored not to be launching a 5G phone until at the earliest. One analyst predicts sales of 5G phones won't eclipse those of 4G devices till And T-Mobile is marking as the year it all comes together.
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In the meantime, 4G networks will continue to carry the wireless load for the mobile carriers, just as 3G saw us through the transition to 4G. Another word to the wise: Be aware of unusual claims about 5G coverage. If you don't need a 5G phone at this minute, watch for 5G deals and promotional bundles from your carrier, once 5G goes live in your area. Consider switching carriers, too, if one has a better deal or better coverage in your area when you're ready to move to 5G. Know that wherever you live -- urban or especially rural -- service most likely won't be widely available for some time.
Before you make the move to a 5G phone and service, ask your carrier how you'll know when you're connected to 5G and about its return policy if you're not getting acceptable 5G speeds. Plus, thanks to the release of the ARM11 chip, cell phone processors were finally fast and efficient enough to power a device that combined the functionality of a phone, a computer, and an iPod. And wireless minutes had become cheap enough that Apple could resell them to customers; companies like Virgin were already doing so. Sigman and his team were immediately taken with the notion of the iPhone.
Cingular's strategy, like that of the other carriers, called for consumers to use their mobile phones more and more for Web access. The voice business was fading; price wars had slashed margins. The iPhone, with its promised ability to download music and video and to surf the Internet at Wi-Fi speeds, could lead to an increase in the number of data customers.
And data, not voice, was where profit margins were lush. What's more, the Cingular team could see that the wireless business model had to change. The carriers had become accustomed to treating their networks as precious resources, and handsets as worthless commodities.
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This strategy had served them well. By subsidizing the purchase of cheap phones, carriers made it easier for new customers to sign up—and get roped into long-term contracts that ensured a reliable revenue stream. But wireless access was no longer a luxury; it had become a necessity. The greatest challenge facing the carriers wasn't finding brand-new consumers but stealing them from one another.
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Simply bribing customers with cheap handsets wasn't going to work. Sigman and his team wanted to offer must-have devices that weren't available on any other network. Who better to create one than Jobs? For Cingular, Apple's ambitions were both tantalizing and nerve-racking. A cozy relationship with the maker of the iPod would bring sex appeal to the company's brand. And some other carrier was sure to sign with Jobs if Cingular turned him down—Jobs made it clear that he would shop his idea to anyone who would listen.
But no carrier had ever given anyone the flexibility and control that Jobs wanted, and Sigman knew he'd have trouble persuading his fellow executives and board members to approve a deal like the one Jobs proposed. Sigman was right.
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The negotiations would take more than a year, with Sigman and his team repeatedly wondering if they were ceding too much ground. At one point, Jobs met with some executives from Verizon, who promptly turned him down. It was hard to blame them. For years, carriers had charged customers and suppliers for using and selling services over their proprietary networks.
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By giving so much control to Jobs, Cingular risked turning its vaunted—and expensive—network into a "dumb pipe," a mere conduit for content rather than the source of that content. Sigman's team made a simple bet: The iPhone would result in a surge of data traffic that would more than make up for any revenue it lost on content deals. Jobs wouldn't wait for the finer points of the deal to be worked out. Around Thanksgiving of , eight months before a final agreement was signed, he instructed his engineers to work full-speed on the project.
And if the negotiations with Cingular were hairy, they were simple compared with the engineering and design challenges Apple faced. For starters, there was the question of what operating system to use. Since , when the idea for an Apple phone was first hatched, mobile chips had grown more capable and could theoretically now support some version of the famous Macintosh OS.
But it would need to be radically stripped down and rewritten; an iPhone OS should be only a few hundred megabytes, roughly a 10th the size of OS X. Before they could start designing the iPhone, Jobs and his top executives had to decide how to solve this problem. Engineers looked carefully at Linux, which had already been rewritten for use on mobile phones, but Jobs refused to use someone else's software.
They built a prototype of a phone, embedded on an iPod, that used the clickwheel as a dialer, but it could only select and dial numbers—not surf the Net. The conversation about which operating system to use was at least one that all of Apple's top executives were familiar with. They were less prepared to discuss the intricacies of the mobile phone world: things like antenna design, radio-frequency radiation, and network simulations. To ensure the iPhone's tiny antenna could do its job effectively, Apple spent millions buying and assembling special robot-equipped testing rooms.
To make sure the iPhone didn't generate too much radiation, Apple built models of human heads—complete with goo to simulate brain density—and measured the effects. To predict the iPhone's performance on a network, Apple engineers bought nearly a dozen server-sized radio-frequency simulators for millions of dollars apiece. Even Apple's experience designing screens for iPods didn't help the company design the iPhone screen, as Jobs discovered while toting a prototype in his pocket: To minimize scratching, the touchscreen needed to be made of glass, not hard plastic like on the iPod.
Through it all, Jobs maintained the highest level of secrecy. Internally, the project was known as P2, short for Purple 2 the abandoned iPod phone was called Purple 1. Teams were split up and scattered across Apple's Cupertino, California, campus. Whenever Apple executives traveled to Cingular, they registered as employees of Infineon, the company Apple was using to make the phone's transmitter. Even the iPhone's hardware and software teams were kept apart: Hardware engineers worked on circuitry that was loaded with fake software, while software engineers worked off circuit boards sitting in wooden boxes.
By January , when Jobs announced the iPhone at Macworld, only 30 or so of the most senior people on the project had seen it. The hosannas greeting the iPhone were so overwhelming it was easy to ignore its imperfections. In turn, Cingular began aggressively advertising the "Allover Network", citing Telephia as "the leading independent research company.
Power and Associates consistently ranked Cingular at or near the bottom of every geographical region in its Wireless Call Quality Study, which is based on a smaller survey of 23, wireless users. This campaign had to come to an abrupt end. Telephia, which tests wireless networks by making over 6 million calls per year in what it claims is the world's largest wireless network test program, initially refused to provide details on its study, and a spokesman for the company has said, according to the Boston Globe , that "Cingular shouldn't have even mentioned the company's name to a reporter.
That campaign is continuing.